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PROPERTY TAX REVENUE ASSESSMENT LEVELS AND
TAXING RATES: THE KENTUCKY ROLLBACK LAW
The problem areas of property taxation are innumerable but
one basic consideration is the sufficiency of revenue to meet gov-
ernmental demands. Revenue is affected by many factors, two
of the most prominent being the level of assessment and the rate
of taxing levy. The purpose of this note will be to explore the
interrelationship between these two factors to illustrate their
effect upon revenue production in Kentucky. This will be accom-
plished by first focusing upon the somewhat unique history of the
property assessment practices as found in the judicial interpreta-
tions of the Kentucky law. Additionally, attention will be given
to the subsequent legislative reaction to the judicial activity-a
reaction that short-circuited the normal effect of the assessment
level and taxing rate upon the amount of revenue produced. The
result of this legislative action was production of an amount of
revenue which bore only minimal resemblance to the needs of
the particular taxing authority. This latter result is the final focus
of the note.
Before proceeding the reader should be forewarned that the
material he is about to read is, to say the least, somewhat con-
fusing. Although a large part of the responsibility must lie with
the author, the Kentucky General Assembly must accept its share.
The Legislature, in its wisdom, chose to utilize not only the
inverted sentence structure of most statutes but also chose to
further cloud the issues by employing one word or phrase for
more than one meaning or situation.
I. JUDICIAL HISTORY
Section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
All property, not exempted from taxation by this Constitution,
shall be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated
at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale; and any
officer, or other person authorized to assess values for taxation,
who shall commit any willful error in the performance of his
duty, shall be deemed guilty of misfeasance, and upon con-
viction thereof shall forfeit his office, and be otherwise pun-
ished as may be provided by law. (Emphasis added).
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Similarly various sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
[hereinafter KRS] provide for assessment of property at its "fair
cash value" as a part of the statutory scheme for implementing
the property tax.' Close reading of these requirements reveals no
intention, indication, or even method of assessing property at less
than its fair cash value. Yet, for at least seventy-five years tax
officials assessed property at less than this standard and both the
public and the courts have condoned such assessments.' Because
of the clear requirement for fair cash value assessment contained
in the law the most important facet of the development of under-
assessment, for present purposes, lies in the judicial acceptance,
and in some cases sanction, of the practice. To understand how
this acceptance came about it is necessary to trace the case
history of the fair cash value requirement from its first affirmation
to its resurgence. Brevity demands that only a representative
sample of the cases3 be dealt with.
The initial affirmation of the standard of fair cash value was,
apparently, in the 1899 case of Louisville Railway Co. v. Common-
wealth.4 In that case the railroad was protesting the assessment
of its property at fair cash value, claiming that the vast majority
of other property owners in the state were being assessed at less
than fair cash value. Although acknowledging that fair cash
value was the constitutional standard, the railroad sought a lower
assessment for its property because of the prevailing practice of
lower assessment.5 The response of the Court of Appeals to this
claim has two important facets. First, the opinion stated flatly
that the constitution required assessment at fair cash value and
that failure to assess at that standard was illegal. To lower the
railroad's assessment would violate a clear constitutional com-
mand. The Court admitted, but hesitated to take judicial notice
of, the occurrence of underassessment which it believed to be
unfair and illegal; disregard of the law would not, however, be a
1 See Ky. 1Ev. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRSI §§ 132.440, 132.450, 133.150
(Baldwin's 1969).
2 Luckett v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. 1960). See also
Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 697-98 (Ky. 1965) and cases cited.
3 See cases cited at note 2 supra; Note, 100% Assessment In Kentucky, 54
Ky. L.J. 98, 104-14 (1965).
449 S.W. 486 (Ky. 1899).
5 Id. at 487.
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basis for nullifying fair cash value assessment. 6 Consequently the
Court refused to lower the assessment.
The second facet of the opinion involves what the Court did
not do. Although aware of the practice of underassessment, the
court opinion made no attempt to rectify the situation or to
remedy the unfairness inherent in the treatment of the railroad.
The Court recommended that wherever such instances occur
interested taxpayers could bring criminal actions against the
assessors to remove them from office or to force compliance with
the fair cash value standard.7 This failure to act was to have
important consequences in the subsequent interpretation of the
opinion for the United States Supreme Court would later find
that this opinion discovered no redress in the courts of the state
for the problem of underassessment.8 Likewise, later opinions of
the Court of Appeals would declare an absence of power to deal
with the problemY Whether these were correct interpretations
is subject to some debate, 0 but the fact remains that until 1965
no decision seriously questioned these interpretations.
The next important development involved the first court-
sanctioned retreat from the fair cash value standard. In Greene
v. Louisville & 1.1. Co." the plaintiffs brought suit in federal
district court claiming violation of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The alleged viola-
tion arose as a result of assessment of their corporate property
at 75% of value while other taxable property was assessed "sys-
tematically and intentionally at not more than 52% of actual
value."' 2  The district court entered an order assessing the
property at not more than 60% of actual value and defendants
6Id. at 488.
7id.
8 Greene v. Louisville & I.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 512-13 (1917).
) See e.g., Luckett v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. 1960).
10 The basis for these interpretations probably arose from the statement of
the Court in Louisville Railway that the constitutional provisions are capable of
being put into execution only through the selection of proper assessing officials.
49 S.W. 486, 488 (Ky. 1899). While this can be read to mean the only remedy
is through the election process, if "proper" is emphasized and modified by "only"
then the statement may read that only proper assessing officers are capable and
should be elected, with no indication one way or the other as to judicial mean's
of correcting improper action. When the Court's statement concerning the
possibility of criminal action against an assessor is read in conjunction, it seems
even more likely that the opinion was not excluding judicial remedy in these
cases, only indicating that it would not act in this instance.
11244 U.S. 499 (1917).
12 Id. at 502.
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appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States
which affirmed.' 3 The Supreme Court's decision was not based
on the provisions of the United States Constitution, but upon
mandates of the Kentucky Constitution.14 The Court looked at
section 172 and read it in light of sections 171 and 174, which
required taxing corporate and individual property at a uniform
value and identical rates.15 When so read, the Court found the
primary purpose of the taxing scheme was unformity rather than
some particular level of assessment.
Therefore, the principal if not the sole reason for adopting
"fair cash value" as the standard for valuations, is as a con-
venient means to an end-the end being equal taxation. But
if the standard be systematically departed from with respect to
certain classes of property, while applied as to other property,
it does not serve but frustrates the very object it was designed
to accomplish. It follows that the duty to assess at full value
cannot be supreme in all cases, but must yield where necessary
to avoid defeating its own purpose.16
Quite obviously this decision was contradictory to the result
reached in Louisville Railway; indeed the relief granted in Greene
was precisely the relief which the Kentucky Court of Appeals had
ruled was prohibited by the Kentucky Constitution and which,
if granted, would result in unacceptable distortion of the taxing
scheme. 17 In Greene, the relief was granted on the grounds that
this was the only means of saving the essence of the taxing
scheme.' 8 The latter reasoning was apparently based upon an
interpretation of Louisville Railway to the effect that there was no
judicial remedy for the unequal assessment problem in the Ken-
tucky court system. 9 Thus, of the three possible alternatives
which faced the courts-lowering the assessment of the complain-
ing taxpayer, raising the assessments of all property owners to
fair cash value, or allowing the unequal assessment to continue-
13Id. at 503.
14Id. at 516, 519.
15 Id. at 515.
16 Id. at 516.
17 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
18 See note 16 supra.
19 See note 8 supra. As to the validity of this interpretation see note 10 supra.
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the Court of Appeals chose the third while the Supreme Court
chose the first.
20
In less than a year, the decision in Eminence Distillery Co. v.
Henry County Board of Supervisors5' placed the Kentucky Court
squarely in line with holding and rationale of Greene. The fact
situation in Eminence was almost identical to those in Louisville
Railway and Greene. In that case, as in the prior ones, the plain-
tiff sought to have the assessment on its property lowered to
equalize it with property of other taxpayers; 22 no attempt was
made to obtain equalization by increasing the percentage assess-
ment of other taxable property.2
In its opinion the Court first read the Kentucky Constitution
as being primarily concerned with equality of taxation and the
imposition of a uniform burden upon the taxpayer.2 4 The Court
concluded that unequal assessment would result in non-uniform
tax burdens, thus making differing assessment percentages of fair
cash value violative of the constitutional demand for equality
and uniformity. 5 Having concluded that unequal assessment
practices were discriminatory, and since the parties agreed that
such was the case with the appellants, 6 the only remaining prob-
lem was the remedy. It was at this point, determination of the
remedy that Louisville Railway and Greene had parted ways and
it was here that the Court chose to follow Greene. In determining
what the remedy would be the Court in Eminence turned first to
the contention that there was no judicial relief available to
appellant. In dealing with this problem the Court analyzed the
two alternative remedies that would equalize the assessments:
2 0 In ensuing decisions the second alternative was quite abandoned and the
choice for all practical purposes, lay between the other two and the Court of
Appeais soon adopted the Greene rationale. See note 21 infra and accompanying
text. The possibility of raising the assessment of property owners not before the
Court was not seriously considered until the Russman case. See note 58 et seq.
infra.
2 200 S.W. 347 (Ky. 1918).
22 Id. at 350-51. "All of the witnesses, including the county assessor, agree
that real property in Henry County was uniformly and systematically valued and
assessed by the assessor and the county board of supervisors for taxation purposes,
for the year 1916, at a sum which would not exceed 60 per centurn of its fair




26 Id. at 351.
2
7It was this belief which prompted the Supreme Court to act in Greene. See
notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
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raising all assessments to the fair cash value level or lowering the
plaintiff's assessment to the level used for other property. As to
the first alternative, the Court found that it had no power to
effect such a remedy.28 Thus an implication which may or may
not have been intended in the Louisville Railway9 has become a
part of the law, solemnly pronounced so in Eminence, but con-
spiciously lacking in precedent and supported only by somewhat
questionable logic.0 Nevertheless the decision was followed until
1965.
Having concluded that the only practicable, effective remedy
was to lower the corporation's assessment to equal that of other
property owners, the only remaining hurdle was the constitutional
requirement for assessment at fair cash value. Without hesitating
the Court turned to a quotation from Greene,31 adopting the
rationale that the primary purpose of the constitutional require-
ments was uniformity and equality of assessment rather than
assessment at fair cash value.32 Thus, with the advent of Em-
inence, the constitutional mandate of full cash value assessment
(affirmed in Louisville Railway) gave way to the "uniformity"
interpretation of Greene.
While all constitutions will require interpretation from time to
time, and indeed the Kentucky Constitution is particularly suited
for producing strained interpretations, 33 the key requirement prior
to such interpretation is necessity. In this instance both the United
States Supreme Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals had
declared such necessity based upon their inability to provide
other remedies.34 While it may be true that necessity knows no
28 220 S.W. 347, 351 (1918)
The quarterly court, the circuit court, and this court are without necessary
powers to effect the remedy in that way. Such a remedy the appellant
cannot make effective, and the result is that it is no remedy at all as to it.
Id.
s9 See note 10 supra. Doubt as to the possibility that the opinion in Louisville
Railway intended to give such an implication is strengthened by the failure of the
Eminence Court to cite that case or any other as a basis for its holding that it had
no power.
30 The apparant basis for the holding that the Court had no power to raise
the assessments of other property owners not before the Court was that the
appellant could not force compliance with such a decision. This ignored prior
statements of the Court to the effect that criminal charges could be brought
against an assessor who failed to meet his responsibility. See note 7 supra and
accompanying text.
31 See text at note 16 supra.
32 200 S.W. 347, 352 (1918).
3 3 See, e.g., Matthews v. Allen, 360 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1962).
34 See note 18, 28 supra and accompanying text.
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law, it is possible that other remedies did exist which would have
met the plain meaning of the constitutional language,35 indeed,
the Kentucky Court was later to decide that such a course should
be followed 0
In the years following the decision in Eminence many cases
were decided-some on very nearly the same point,37 some testing
the outer limits of the ruling's-but for the present purposes only
two need be dealt with. The first of these was Rogers v. Pike
County Board of Supervisors." The problem in that case arose
from a somewhat different fact situation than previous cases,
in that a parcel of land had been reassessed at a value higher
than either the purchase price or the agreed upon fair cash value
of the property.40 This over-valuation was the abnormal result
of applying the standard assessing procedure used throughout the
county.41 The plaintiff sought to reduce the assessment to fair
cash value as required by section 172 of the Constitution,42
while the defendant county argued that prior decisions of the
Court had interpreted the law to require only equality of assess-
ment with no concern for fair cash value.43 The Court rejected
the defendant's argument, holding that property could be assessed
at lower than fair cash value because in that range the constitu-
tional concern for equality and uniformity are paramount.44 How-
ever, when the valuation rises above fair cash value, the equality
principle must take second place to the constitutional intent to
place upper limits on the property tax. Thus, "property may not
be assessed for taxation at a valuation in excess of its fair cash
value."45
The second case involved an application of the equality doc-
trine in a slightly different manner. The issue was not whether
the value of appellee's property was to be equalized with similar
35 See note 30 supra.
36 See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
37 See Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 697-98 (Ky. 1965); Luckett v.
Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. 1960); Ky. LEGIsLATivE RE-
SEARCH COMMeN, RESEARCH REPORT No. 44, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES [hereafter
44 LRC] 8-9 (1967) and cases cited therein.38 See 44 LRC 8-10 and cases cited therein.
39157 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1941).
40 Id. at 347.
41 Id. at 347-48.
42 Id. at 347.





property, but at which step in the assessment scheme was the
equalization to occur. Luckett v. Tennessee Gas Transmission
Co. 46 involved the application of a franchise tax based upon the
assessed value of the capital stock of the corporation and the step
in the assessment process at which the value should be equalized
with the assessed value of similar property. The procedure for
applying the franchise tax was comprised of several steps which
finally resulted in determination of the amount of property subject
to tax. 7 The Department of Revenue wanted to evaluate the
property at the completion of each step and equalize the assess-
ment thereon, while the appellee sought to equalize only the final
value subject to taxation. In upholding the appellee's contention,
the Court, quoting from an earlier case on the point,48 reasoned
that the primary object of the statutory scheme is determination
of the franchise value and that the concept of equalization can
be applied only to the final, ascertained value which is itself
subject to the tax.49 The important aspect of the case lies with
the refusal of the Court to allow the equalizing principle to inter-
fere with or permeate the property tax scheme beyond very simple,
gross adjustments of final assessment values. This attitude seemed
to indicate that the Court, although willing to accept the strained
interpretation in Greene and Eminence, was determined to con-
fine the concept to its narrowest possible application.6 °
To briefly summarize the position of the law at this point, the
constitutional requirement that all property subject to taxation
should be assessed at its fair cash value had been interpreted to
mean that all property should be assessed equally-at the same
percentage of fair cash value. The Court had limited the appli-
cation of the equalization principle, viz. adjustments could be
made to value property at its fair cash value or less, but no
46331 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ky. 1960).
47 See KRS § 136.160 (Baldwin's 1969). The process involved determining
the value of appellee's capital stock within the state, fixing the value of tangible
property within the state, and subtracting the latter from the former to determine
the value of the property subject to taxation.4 8 Louisville v. Howard, 208 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1947).
49 Lucket v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Ky. 1960).50 It is also interesting to note that the case contains one of the earliest and
strongest attacks upon the equalization below fair cash value concept: "It is
difficult to understand why 'equality' should not be reached at the top, i.e. 'fair
cash value' rather than at a percentage of that value. ... Id. at 881. Yet the
Court accepted the idea because of judicial precedent, passive legislative approval,
and the belief that since the parties were not before the Court no action could
be taken against them. Id. at 882.
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property was to be assessed at more than fair cash value regardless
of equality of assessment. Likewise the concept was applied only
to final valuation subject to tax; the statutory assessment scheme
itself was not to be interfered with until the last possible moment.
This then was the state of affairs prior to Russman v. Luckett.5'
II. RussmrA v. LucKi-r
In discussing the judicial adventures of fair cash value assess-
ment little mention has been made as to the practical effects of
these decisions upon both the administration of the tax and the
revenue it was producing. For present purposes, a sufficient indi-
cation can be gathered from the attitude of the Court of Appeals
as it reversed the history of fair cash value:
It is apparent the situation is bad from almost any standpoint,
is becoming worse, is unfair, is administratively inefficient, and
gives tax Commissioners an unwarranted and arbitrary control
of the tax base.
5 2
It was the existance of these conditions plus "the fact that the
current method of assessment [was] in direct violation of clearly
written mandatory laws""3 that prompted the 1965 decision in
Russman.
In each of the cases previously discussed, property owners
were seeking a reduction of their assessments rather than an
increase in the assessments of others, and this was the fact situa-
tion in almost all fair cash value cases prior to Russman.54 How-
ever, in Russman the Court was faced with a slightly different ap-
proach in that those attacking the underassessment were seeking
a declaration of rights and relief under a mandamus action55
51391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).52 Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1965). Further indications
of the effect of the previous decisions arise when the statewide median
real estate assessment ratio of approximately 27 percent is coupled with the
constitutional limits upon the rate of taxation. This state of affairs obviously
severely curtailed the amount of revenue available to the taxing authority.
53 Id.
54 See Luckett v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1960) for a
discussion of these cases.
65 Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Ky. 1965). There were actually
three cases before the Court at this time. McDevitt v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 700
(Ky. 1965), was an action brought by the owners of intangible property. The
suit presented the question of equal protection and sought a declaration of rights
against the commissioner of revenue and some county tax commissioners. The
Franklin County circuit court dismissed the suit ruling that there was no justiciable
(Continued on next page)
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rather than a lowering of their own particular assessments. In-
deed, some of the appellants were not taxpayers or property
owners at all but were students whose education was intimately
connected with the property tax.5 In reversing the lower court
orders dismissing the complaints, the Court of Appeals cast the
issue in terms of two questions: first, who had standing to chal-
lenge the status quo, and second, what should and could be done
about it? This was the first attempt to reconsider these threshold
questions since the decision in Eminence and it was to prove a
dramatic reconsideration.
The question of standing presented the court with its first
hurdle. As previously indicated the earlier cases had involved
an individual seeking adjustment of the assessment of his own
property. Perhaps it was because of the absence of other property
owners that the Court had felt constrained to lower one individ-
uars assessment rather than raise the assessment of those not
before the Court.57 In this instance the appellants were not seek-
ing adjustments of their assessment but rather a declaratory
judgement as to their right to have the assessment of other
property owners increased.5 s When considered in the light of
previous decisions of the Court of Appeals any remedy sought
which involved changing the assessment of property owners not
before the court was clearly beyond reach.59 Since this was
exactly the remedy sought, the lower court dismissed the com-
plaint for lack of a justiciable issue. 60
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
controversy, or other remedies were available, or that assessment was a matter of
discretion. 391 S.W.2d at 701. The third case was Miller v. Layne, 391 S.W.2d
701 ( Ky. 1965), in which the taxpayers simply sought to remove the Jefferson
County tax commissioner on the grounds that his continuing assessment of ]property
below fair cash value was a violation of the law which called for his dismissal
under KRS § 132.307(3). The Jefferson County circuit court dismissed the case
ruling that the tax commissioner had not violated the law. Id. at 702. The Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court in each instance, adopting the reasoning
and opinion set out at length in Russman.
56 Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Ky. 1965); Brief for Appellant
at 6, Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965) [hereinafter Brief for Ap-
pellant].
57 See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
58 391 S.W.2d at 696.
59 See Luckett v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1960).
60 Brief for AppellJants at 2. The transistion from "standing" to "justiciable
issue" is made as folows: The Court had held that an individual did not have
standing to challenge the assessment of property whose owner was not before
the court. Thus where such challenge was attempted there was no issue for
the court to decide because the challenger had no standing. See generally
(Continued on next page)
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In reaching the decision that appellants had standing to bring
the issue the Court of Appeals shifted the focus on fair cash value
assessment. In Eminence, and the cases following, the Court had
felt that the primary thrust of the requirement was to deal with
the assessment relationship between property owners rather than
as some controlling standard over assessment of all property
owners as a whole.61 The decision in Russman that the parties had
standing to bring the issue of necessity required a finding that
there was an issue of controversy to bring.62 It is submitted that
the finding of a justiciable controversy, in spite of the fact that no
property owner was seeking a readjustment of his assessment in
relation to the property of others, was based upon the altered
view that the requirement of fair cash value provided a method
of administering the property tax.6" Under this view any individ-
ual or group designated by law to receive the benefits resulting
from the imposition of the property tax might bring an action to
enforce proper administration of it.
Having determined that a controversy did exist and that
appellants were proper parties to bring the issue the Court, as a
means of determining the proper remedy, turned to the merits of
the controversy. It must be remembered that, although the Court
would allow appellants to challenge the concept, case law appar-
ently still held that fair cash value was to be equated with equality
of treatment.64 To change this standard the Court first examined
the constitutional and statutory passages dealing with fair cash
value.65 This examination led to the conclusion that:
Obviously the constitutional provision and the cited statutes
exhibit a very specific purpose and a practical plan by which
all property in the Commonwealth (not exempted by the
Constitution) shall be assessed for taxing purposes at its
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Brief for Appellees at 3R-6R; Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965)
[hereinafter Brief ?or Appellees].61 This attitude was best revealed in Luckett v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331
S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. 1960).
62 Suttce it to say that in our considered judgment a justiciable contro-
versy is presented. There are no other adequate remedies which may be
invoked by these plaintiffs and they have a right to bring these two actions
and to obtain a declaration of rights. 391 S.W.2d at 696.
63 On this point see Brief for Appellant at 9-16.
64 Brief for Appellees at 3R-6R.




fair cash value. Nothing in [the] record suggests any uncer-
tainty, impracticability or inequity in either the purpose or the
plan.66
Viewing the law in this light, the fair cash value standard as
interpreted in previous court decisions required an application
which went beyond the plain meaning of the term.6 7 At this point
the Court then turned to appellee's arguments which sought to
continue the "equality" interpretation.
The appellee's first contention was that the constitutional
provision and the statutes were without "any legal effect [being]
abrogated by a contrary custom or public policy of 75 years
standing."68 The reasoning was that, although the law was clear
in its requirements, it has repeatedly and continually been vio-
lated to such an extent that it had been given judicial notice in
Greene.69 And, when a law has been so abandoned, it would be
unfair and against the public interest to revive such a law or
attempt to return it to its original meaning. In support of this
argument appellees cited three cases, two of which were Supreme
Court decisions. However, one dealt with the carryover effect of
the Spanish Civil Code70 while the other involved a moot deci-
sion.71 The third case was an 1840 Iowa state court decision
which declared the revival of a law to be contrary to "Anglo-
Saxon liberty."72 In rejecting this proposition the Russman Court
found no authority supporting appellees arguments. The Iowa
case was dismissed by questioning its soundness. Likewise, the
Supreme Court cases were properly rejected as not being in
point. In addition the Kentucky Court cited another Supreme
Court case for the proposition that the executive branch cannot,
by failure to enforce a law, cause it to be repealed or modified.
73
Beyond this the Court said:
In any event, we are dealing with our fundamental law. It is
not outdated, or obsolete, or contrary to any policy we know
66391 S.W.2d at 697.
67 See, e.g., Luckett v. Tenn. Gas Trans. Co., 331 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1960).
68 391 S.W.2d at 697.
69 See text at note 16 supra.
7 0 Adams v. Norris, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 353 (1860).
71Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). See 100% Assessment In Kentucky,
supra note 3, at 105-06 for a discussion of these cases and their applicability to the
Russman facts.
72 Hill v. Smith, 1 Morris 95 (Iowa 1840).
73 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson, 346 U.S. 100 (1952).
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of. The public has acquiesced in its non-observance simply
because private rights were not adversely affected and citizens
heretofore have not been inclined to take the initiative to com-
pel executive compliance. This law today is just as vital and
enforceable as it was the day it was written into the Con-
stitution.74
This reasoning allowed the Court to treat Russman as presenting
a new issue in contrast to Eminence and its kin and, as will be
seen, the Court pursues this idea throughout the opinion. 5
The second major contention advanced by the appellees was
that previous judicial interpretation of the pertinent law com-
pletely and irrevocably substituted equality and uniformity for
fair cash value. While appellees advanced many cases in support
of their argument 6 the Court focused upon only one.7 That
case involved extreme disparaties in the assessment of intangible
property and real property and the Court there refused to lower
the intangible property assessment. Since the Kentucky Constitu-
tion would permit classification of property for tax rates the court
had held that equality of assessment between classes of property
was not required. The Russman Court interpreted that decision
to have no bearing upon fair cash valued.7  The Court also dis-
cussed the history of the interpretation of fair cash value and
explained that previous decisions had lowered assessments be-
cause that was the only practical remedy available to the Court.79
The Court felt that when Eminence, Tennessee Gas and similar
cases were read in this light it was obvious that the original mean-
ing of fair cash value remained intact. Only the absence of a
properly structured action had prevented earlier enforcement of
the law; not a total absence of power to deal with the problem.80
74 391 S.W.2d at 697.
75 See notes 80-81 infra and accompanying text.
76 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 60, at 9R-12R.
7 7 Kentucky Finance Co. v. McCord, 290 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1956).
78 As a matter of fact the case seems to be entirely out of place, either in the
argument or the opinon. However, rejection of appellees' premise on this founda-
tion seems particularly weak.
79 The recognition that the reduction in assessment was the only practical
remedy was further explained in [Tenn. Gas]. It was noted that the court's duty
was to dispense justice in the individual case and that the only effective way to
achieve equality for that particular plaintiff was to reduce his assessment to the
general level. 391 S.W.2d 698.
0 ,,As a matter of fact, [this Court] has consistently recognized what the Con-
stitution and the statutes require but until now has never had presented to it the
kind of proceeding in which those provisions appropriately could be enforced." Id.
1971] NOTES
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The acknowledgement of this power clearly separates Russman
from Eminence making the former the long awaited follow-up to
Louisville Railway Co. v. Commonwealth."'
The final contention of the appellees in Russman was that
mandamus was not the proper basis for the action. The majority
opinion rejected that as being clearly erroneous. Having an-
swered the appellee's arguments the only remaining obstacle for
the Court was the remedy to be given. It was at this point that
Louisville Railway had faltered, planting the seed which had led
to the course taken in Greene and Eminence.sm
In attempting to provide a remedy the Court first rejected
some of appellants' requests. Any attempt to remove or otherwise
punish tax officials for their previous failure to comply with the
law would not be allowed. To do so would be unfair to those
practicing a universal, but illegal procedure and, in any case, the
most important thing was to correct the situation. 4 Likewise, the
Court rejected any suggestion that property be reassessed retro-
actively; to do so would be both impossible and unjust.8 5 Finally,
the change to full assessment could not be implemented im-
mediately in view of the prodigious amount of adjustment re-
quired.88 For these reasons the Court declared that full assessment
would become effective January 1, 1966, thus giving the taxing
authorities and the legislature six months to prepare for the
change. After that any failure to positively comply with the fair
cash value standard "would certainly be willful."
8 7
III. RESPONSE TO RUSsmAN
With the order for compliance to fair cash value under the
8149 S.W. 486 (Ky. 1899). See note 7 supra and accompanying text,82 The defendants argued that the tax commissioner must have the discretion
to equalize property valuation. See KRS 133.150 (Baldwin's 1969). Such discre-
tion on the part of an executive officer would make a mandamus action inap-
propriate. Brief for Appellees at 14R-19R. The opinion rejected this argument
on the basis that the pertinent statute gave discretion only as to the percentage
change necessary to bring property to full fair cash value; it did not give discretion
as to the ultimate standardfor assessing property. '"ere is nothing discretionary
about these basic duties. While there may be optional methods of performance,
it is absurd to suggest that the county tax commissioners or the Commissioner of
Revenue may comply with the law or ignore it in their discretion." 391 S.W.2d
698-99.
8 3 See note 10 supra.
84 391 S.W.2d at 699.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 699-700.
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"new" interpretation of that phrase the Court had come fall circle;
returning to the business left unfinished in Louisville Railway.
In so doing the Court engendered a fear of exorbitant increases in
the property tax; a fear which gathered such strength that it
forced the calling of a special session of the General Assembly.88
It is possible that the Court anticipated just such a reaction and
had attempted to allay such fears by declaring that:
In the performance of our duty we are not, by this decision,
in any sense changing the law of taxation, or the tax structure,
or increasing the tax burden. We are simply declaring and
enforcing the law, and the law is made by the people.89
In spite of this disclaimer an intense public reaction did set in.
The result was the so-called "rollback" law that was produced
by the special session of the legislature in the fall of 1965.0
Because the law effectively nullified the immediate impact of
Russman it is necessary to understand the force which prompted
this special legislation.
Prior to Russman the assessment of property at fractional
values had become a statewide practice and the percentage of
assessment was continually declining.91 As the demand for serv-
ices grew the taxing authorities were faced with the necessity of
gathering more revenue and as a result tax rates were increased
to the legal limits.92 With tax rates at the legal maximum, the
Russman requirement for fair cash value assessment would pro-
duce almost a threefold tax increase.9 3 Of course this increase
would occur only if the local officials responsible for establishing
tax rates maintained them at their maximum level.
The immediate response to Russman was generally favorable.
Those who commented on the new assessment level were en-
couraged that the responsibility for establishing the amount of
revenue had been removed from the local assessing official and
returned to the local governmental unit responsible for setting the
88 See notes 99-112 infra.
89 391 S.W.2d at 700.
90 See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
91 Brief for Appellants, supra note 56, at 3-4.
92 See 100% Assessment in Kentucky, supra note 3, at 101.
93The median assessment was 27 percent, thus a jump in assessment to 100
percent with the application of the old rates would produce more than three times
as much revenue.
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tax rate. 4 It seemed to be generally assumed among the officials
queried that tax rates would go down as the assessment level
increased.9 5 Indeed, some city96 and schooP 7 officials pledged to
reduce the rates under their control in an attempt to retain rev-
enue at pre-Russman levels.99
In spite of these assurances and the admonition by the Court99
an adverse public reaction set in almost immediately. Although
the elected officials should have been responsive to local sentiment
concerning the tax rate the consensus was that legislative action
on a statewide basis was required. The Farm Bureau demanded
legislative enforcement of decreased rates and expressed fear of
disastrous increases for already hard-pressed farmers. 00 Officials
expressed fear that industrial recruiting would be damaged by
the requirement for 100 percent assessment, regardless of rate
reduction.'" Fears were expressed that the distilleries would be
driven from the state.10 2 The news media contributed to the con-
fusion as to exactly what effect the Court of Appeals decision
would have with headlines such as "Court Ruling, If Unmodified,
Could Triple City Tax Bills" 0 3 and "Only Slight Tax Rise Due-In
Theory";1 4 articles such as one which calculated the hypothetical
tax increase if rates remained the same; 0 5 and editorials which
declared "that property tax bills will (eventually) increase in
varying degrees" and admonished the school authorities to beware
of a legislative counter-attack.0 6 In the face of such uncertainty
and with suspicion being voiced that tax rates might not be
lowered by local officials,'0 7 public opinion soon solidified in
opposition to the concept of fair cash value.' 8 Letters to the
newspapers soon began expressing the certainty that a tax increase
94 Courier-Journal (Louisville), June 9, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 7.
95 Id.
96 Id., June 10, 1965, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
9 Id., June 12, 1965, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
98 At least for the time being.
99 See note 89 supra.
100 Courier-Journal (Louisville), June 9, 1965, § 1, at 8, col. 1.
101 Id., June 9, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 7.
102 Id., June 11, 1965, § 1, at 16, col. 5.
103 Id., June 9, 1965, § 1, at 8, col. 6.
104 Id., June 10, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
105 Id., June 11, 1965, § 1, at 16, col. 5.
106 Id., June 10, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
107 See notes 103-04 supra.




would occur and that local officials would do nothing to prevent
the increase." 9 The Governor received letters indicating that
there was no alternative for the individual "but to move out of
the state."" 0 Public reaction grew to the extent that the Governor
was booed during an appearance at a Louisville racetrack."'
It did not take long for some political figures to come forward
to do battle for the "oppressed" taxpayer. In basing his campaign
for re-election on providing tax relief, one state legislator declared
that the incumbent administration planned to foist the tax burden
"on the back of the small farmer, homeowner, and people who
are on fixed incomes with this trick of oppressive taxation."
1 2
Reports began to circulate that the Lieutenant Governor would
call a special session of the legislature to deal with the situation
if the Governor left the state." 3 In the face of these pressures the
Governor called for a special session of the legislature to begin
August 23, 1965 to consider means of controlling the effect of
fair cash value assessment. In explaining the need for a special
session the Governor cited the public reaction to Russman explain-
ing that it was necessary to insure that local officials would act to
prevent large increases in the tax burden." 4
To minimize the effect of the jump in assessment which would
occur in 1966, as a result of full cash value assessment under
109 See, e.g., Courier-Journal (Louisville), June 13, 1965, § 4, at 2, col. 5.
Why local officials would be less responsive to citizen demands is unclear.
The limited scope of their authority should render them less attractive to special
interest lobbying groups whose goals may not coincide with those of the general
public. In such a situation the primary influence upon the elected official could
well be the voter attitude toward the local tax rate.
11o Id., June 14, 1965, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
"ll Id., July 18, 1965, § 4, at 2, col. 2.
112 Id., June 14, 1965, § 2, at 1, col. 7.
"1 Id., July21, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 7. Prior to the .ussman decision Governor
Breathitt had pledged to call a special session of the legislature to deal with the
revenue crisis in the Louisville and Jefferson County School Syvstem. The Governor
postponed the special session following the Court action. Id. June 11, 1965, § 1,
at 1, col. 8.
114 The special session was to consider, in addition to the tax issue, the calling
of a constitutional convention and the adoption of the twenty-fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution. The pressure for a special session came essentially
from three sources; the first was, as mentioned above, the lieutenant governor;
the second was those local officials who would have to administer the rates under
full assessment, apparently they did not want that responsibility and its possible
consequences and sought relief in legislative action; the third source was Demo-
cratic legislators under pressure from constituents who had equated the Court of
Appeals action with the administration. Courier-Journal (Louisville), July 21,
1965, § 1, at 1, col. 7. The general consensus of those seeking a special session was
a desire to produce some type of temporary legislation which would hold tax rates
down for some time, perhaps two years, with an allowance each year for approxi-
mately 15 percent growth,
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Russman, the legislature had to find some means of adjusting the
property tax revenue on a broad, statewide scale. Complicating
its considerations was the property tax structure across the state.
There are 120 counties in Kentucky and within each one there are
three major taxing authorities viz. the county itself, the city, and
the school districts.115 In most cases the pre-Russman assessment
level differed from county to county and thus fair cash value
assessment would have a different impact upon the increase in
revenue depending upon the prior assessment ratio." 6 Likewise
within a county the demand for additional revenue might differ
between districts. Any attempt to regulate, on a statewide basis,
the revenue taken in by these authorities so as to prevent any
sudden, large increase in the property tax would of necessity have
to adapt itself to the convolutions of the structure in each county.
The legislative response was to develop a two level approach.
First, the budgeting authority of a particular district was to be
limited in the amount of revenue it could demand through budget
requests. The limits on these budgets were determined in refer-
ence to the amount of revenue gathered in 1965. No budget was
to be presented "which would require more revenue from ad
valorem taxes than would be produced by application of the
preceeding year's [1965] rate to the preceeding year's assess-
ment.""17 The determination both of this amount and the rate
necessary to gather it were the focus of the second aspect of the
legislative action. That action provided that the amount of rev-
enue gathered was to be limited by establishing a maximum tax
rate. To make this determination the legislature developed the
concept of the "compensating tax rate."""
The statute defined compensating tax rate as the rate applied
to the 1966 (fair cash value) assessment of property [which had
been subject to taxation in 1965], that would produce an amount
115 There are other types of taxing authorities such as library districts and
public utilities districts but the present focus will be upon these three taxing
authorities. They constitute the primary area of conflict.
116 Address by J. E. Luckett, Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue, National
Tax Association Conference, Denver, Colorado, September 27, 1966.
17 See e.g. KRS § 164.470 (Baldwin's 1969).
"18KRS § 132.010(6) (Baldwin's 1969). This rate was to be calculated
separately for each county by multiplying the 1965 tax rate by the 1965 assessment
percentage. In other words, the assessment ratio for 1965 became the ratio of the
fair cash value rate to the fractional assessment rate thus if the assessment ratio




of revenue approximately equal to that produced in 1965."-9 Be-
cause the amount of revenue gathered under any tax levy will
depend upon the rate, establishment of a maximum rate will
effectively control the amount raised. If the maximum rate is
determined by comparison to the amount raised in a previous year,
any subsequent change in assessment values winl have no effect
upon the revenue gathered in later years; 120 the amounts must
correspond, thus forcing the local authority to adjust the rate (in
the usual sense) so as to produce this legislatively fixed amount. 2 1
For the individual, since the total amount of revenue to be
gathered remained the same, his tax burden would remain es-
sentially as it was prior to Russman122 In this manner the legisla-
ture was able to negate the effect of Russman on a state-wide
basis with a procedure which was adaptable to the specific circum-
stances of each taxing structure. This rate-the "compensating
tax rate-was to be determined separately for each county by
multiplying the 1965 tax rate by the 1965 assessment [percent-
age].12
As indicated above the roll-back amendments used direct
budgetary limits as another form of control in specific instances.
Practically speaking, however, this was not a separate device but
rather a statement which simply codified the effect of applying
the compensating tax rate, i.e. limiting available revenue to the
amounts gathered in 1965. The advantage of these budget limits
is that they are clear and direct, but they can only be applied
where the levying power is coupled with the budget formula-
tion.124 Conversely, the compensating tax rate, being a rate, can
be utilized whenever a tax is levied.
IV. ErncT OF "RoLLBAcK" oN TAX=NG Armomnrms
The rollback law was not actually a single piece of legislation;
rather, House Bill I consisted of amendments and additions to the
119 See KRS § 132.010(6) (Baldwin's 1969).
120 Obviously such would not be the case were revenue determined solely by
the assessment ratio.
121 See 44 LRC, supra note 37, at 11.
22 For example the effect on the individual property owner would be as
follows: property assessed in 1965 at $100 with a tax rate of $1.50, in 1966 at
100 percent assessment the property now worth $200 will be subject to a tax rate
of $.75 per $100 or $1.50 total tax.12 3 See 44 LRC at 11.
12 4 The School Building Fund as provided by KRS § 160.476 (Baldwin's
(Continued on next page)
KENwcCy LAw JouNAL[
various enabling statutes of each particular taxing authority."'
Since the changes were not uniform, it is necessary to examine
the three basic taxing authorities (school districts, counties, and
cities) individually, to understand the effect of the rollback law
on revenue production.
A. School Districts
With regard to school districts, the legislation basically limited
the amount of money a district board of education could budget
or collect. The amount which a district school board could
budget was limited to the maximum amount of revenue which
could have been collected under the prior fractional assessment
system. The three exceptions to this limitation were for a net
assessment growth, a ten percent increase (following a public
hearing) and the voted tax levy. '2  Because one or more of these
exceptions are provided for all three taxing authorities, further
elaboration is appropriate.
The normal growth in the value of property would ordinarily
produce increased revenue even though the tax rate remained
the same. However, because the rollback limitations on both
budgets and tax rates were couched in terms of a given amount
the additional value would not be permitted to produce extra
revenue unless an exception was made. This "net assessment
growth" was specifically provided for by section 7 of House Bill
1.127 The additional revenue from increased assessments due to
improvements and new property was not to be included in the
computations of the budgetary limits, thus allowing the amount
of money available to the taxing district to expand. 28 The rate
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
1969) illustrates the p oint. The statute only provides for levying a tax (for a
specific purpose) but there is no provision for submission of a budget. As a result
the amendment of this statute by the special session was cast solely in terms of the
compensating tax rate.
125 See Ky. Acts, ch. 2 (First Extra Session 1965).
12 6 KRS § 160.470(2), (4) (Baldwin's 1969). A further exception to these
limitations was provided by aowing public vote on proposed levies. See note 137
infra and accompanying text.
127 This became KRS § 132.425 (Baldwin's 1969) which states:
All state and local assessing officials shall maintain a list of all properties
which are subject to taxation for school purposes, both real and im-
provements thereon and tangible personalty, which are added to the tax
rolls each year and a list of all such properties which are deleted from the
rolls.




at which this "new property" was to be taxed was the "effective
rate" of the preceeding year. 29 This rate is the same as the actual
rate levied under the compensating tax rate provision; the term
"effective rate" was used to dispel any connection with the amount
limitation contained in the compensating tax rate concept.
130
As noted, net assessment was limited to improvements and
new property under the newly created statute. From 1965 until
1971 this growth did not include adjustments to assessment values
that did not involve new or improved property.131 Thus, action
by the Department of Revenue to equalize assessments across the
state did not produce net assessment growth even where the
equalization adjustment was upward.1' Beginning January 1,
1971, however, the situation was changed. By amendment,133
KRS § 132.425 now provides that net assessment growth will con-
sist of the difference in the total valuation of property rather than
merely improvements or new property increases. Obviously this
change will increase the amount of revenue which may be gath-
ered in addition to the amount determined under the compen-
sating tax rate.
A second procedure, for increasing the amount of revenue,
was made available to the taxing district officials. It was bound
indirectly to previous amounts of revenue. This authority was
limited and could be exercised only within the two year period
immediately following the enactment of the rollback law. 34 The
increase allowed was a ten percent budget increase over the
previous year, thus limiting the total increase to 20 percent of the
amount budgeted under fractional assessment. To qualify for such
an increase, the budgeting authority was required to give public
notice that hearings would be held to explain the amount and
need for the increase. Only after the hearing could a budget be
120 The year immediately preceeding the enactment of this statute was 1965,
thus the tax level of that year was perpetuated for each succeeding year. See, e.g.,
KRS § 160.470(3) (b) (Baldwin's 1969) dealing with the school board.
130 See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
131 See note 127 supra.
132 The problems of attempting to reach fall fair cash value assessment are not
discussed in this paper. For discussion of the problems, particularly the blanket
equalization, from two viewpoints see J. E. Luckett supra note 116; 44 LRC, supra
note 37, at 13, 39. The latter contains citation to many of the equalization cases.
133 Ky. Acts, ch. 260 (1970).
134 See, e.g., KRS § 160.470(4) (a) (b). Failure to exercise this right within
the two year limit did not provide a means of using this exception in later years.
68 Op. Ky. ATr'Y GEN. 222 (1968).
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submitted which called for the additional revenue.'35 These re-
quirements are substantially identical for all three taxing districts,
with the exception that the provision dealing with the cities is
written in terms of tax rate rather than budgetary amount.13
The sole means of exceeding the limits on budgetary requests
lies with a public referendum under KRS § 157.440. 37 Only by
submitting the budgetary requests directly to the eligible voters
of the taxing district may the revenue be substantially increased
with the freedom to apply it to needed areas which might be
beyond the statutory guidelines. The only changes made in this
statute by the rollback amendments were to limit levies approved
prior to the amendments to the compensating tax rate and to
allow a rate sufficient to meet the indebtedness of the school
district.13
The effect of these provisions is to prevent, following the
1967-68 school year, any increase in budget except that provided
by net assessment growth and the tax referendum provisions.'39
While these ten percent increases had the value of being certain,
there was very little relationship between the amount of money
available and the amount needed.
The basic budgetary limitations on the school board were
directly challenged in Miller v. Nunnelley.4 ° The Board of Edu-
cation of the Louisville Independent School District submitted a
budget for the 1970-71 school year which required the levy of a
property tax rate in excess of that authorized by KRS § 160.470 as
amended by the rollback law of 1965. In support of the uncon-
stitutionality of the amendments, appellees stressed two argu-
ments. First, that the legislation perpetuated the unconstitutional
assessment ratios which were struck down in Russman. The amend-
135 E.g., KRtS § 68.240(8) (Baldwin's 1969).
136 KRS § 132.027 (Baldwins 1969). This construction presents some prob-
lems of application. See note 164 infra and accompanying text.
1 7 There are other provisions for the utilization of the public referendum;
however the money gathered may be used only for statutorily designated purposes.
See notes 150-151 infra and accompanying text.
138KRS § 160.470(7) (Baldwin's 1969). These provisions are similar to
those discussed infra at notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
139 See generally 44 LRC, supra note 37, at 10-12.
140 - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971). The Board of Alderman refused to levy a
rate for any amount greater than the limitations of the 1965 amendments, but did
levy one to the full amount under the restrictions. The Board of Education brought
suit to force the aldermen to levy the entire amount. The circuit court held the




ments limited the rates so as to produce amounts similar to those
gathered prior to Russnmn and these amounts were based upon
less than fair cash value assessment. The Board of Education
argued that continuing post-Russman conditions was a perpetua-
tion of an unconstitutional situation and a complete frustration
of that holding and a violation of section 172 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
41
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the amend-
ments did not freeze the revenue available to the school board.
All that the budgetary limitation achieved was a freeze on the
amount of revenue the school board had the discretion to budget.
As to the money the school district could raise, it was unlimited,
so long as the levy was approved by public vote.142 Since an
increase in revenue could be achieved, "unconstitutional assess-
ments [were] not perpetuated and Russman ... [was] not frus-
trated." 43
The validity of this argument depends almost entirely upon
that view point. If the purpose of Russnan was merely to force
the assessment ratio up to the constitutional level the amendments
not affecting the assessment level would not touch upon the
Russman rationale. If, however, the action was taken with a view
to providing some relief for the needy school system, then any
attempt to limit revenue, regardless of method, could be con-
sidered as frustrating Russman. Although argument as to the
purpose of Russman may be presented on both sides, the effect
of the Miller decision was judicial selection of the former.
The second argument advanced by appellees was that estab-
lishment of maximum rates for each county violated section 59
of the Kentucky Constitution, which prohibits special legislation
and the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
'41 Id.
142 See KRS § 160.476, 160.477, 157, 440 (Baldwin's 1969).
143 Miller v. Nunnelley, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971). The Court also
disposed of appellees' argument that the amendments violated the uniformity
requirements of section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution. This provision requires
uniformity only within the territorial bonds of the levying authority and the Court
refused to construe the state as being the levying authority although it exercised
great control over the intracounty districts. - S.W.2d at -. Section 171
also provides that any legislation classifying property shall be subject to a public
referendum upon demand within four months of the adjournment of the legisla-
ture which passed the provision. See 44 LRC 11. However, such demand was not
made probably because a referendum would have overwhelmingly supported the
1965 amendments. See notes 120-27 supra and accompanying text.
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to the United States Constitution.'" The Court cast the issue as:
"the proposition that legislation fixing among the various districts
different maximum basic tax rates that school boards may select
constitutes special and local legislation and denies equal protection
of the law."145 The court in refuting this argument based its
decision on the theory that a classification on the basis of condi-
tions prevailing at a particular time is acceptable so long as the
classification has a reasonable basis. The court felt the purpose
of the legislation was to prevent sudden increases in the tax
burden and the means adopted were the only effective ones avail-
able. Thus, while it is true that the maximum rate would differ
from district to district that disparity was a result of previous
unequal assessment by the district and not as a result of legislative
action.1 46  Since the amendment merely codified the existing
situation for every county, the Court reasoned that there was no
special legislation and thus did not violate section 59.147 Based
upon these conclusions the Court reversed the lower court's hold-
ing and supported the refusal of the alderman to levy the excess
tax.1
48
In addition to the basic budgetary limits, other activities of
the school authorities were affected by the rollback amendments.
School districts have the authority to levy a tax to provide the
revenue for a school building fund. The statute authorizing
such funds was amended by the special session so that no levy
for 1966, or any subsequent year, could be sought which would
144 Miller v. Nunnelley, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971).
145 Id.
146 The Court confused reasonable basis for classification and a reasonable
need for a classification. In this instance there was fear that large increases in the
tax burden were about to occur and this the Court felt was justification for making
some type of classification, as it may well have been. However, selection of the
basis for this classification is another matter; it was based upon factors which the
Court of Appeals had previously ruled unconstitutional. It makes no difference
if these unconstitutional factors were created by the legislature or someone else,
they are unconstitutional and per se unreasonable as a basis for classification.
147 Obviously this begs the question of future changes, since the power to
change lies solely with the legislature.
148 Miller v. Nunnelley, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971). There were two
companion cases handed down, each supporting the rollback amendment. North-
ern Kentucky Area Planning Comm'n v. Hensley, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971)
presented two arguments. The first of which was essentially the same as that in
Miller and the Court rejected it here adopting the Miller rationale. The other argu-
ment contended that the rollback limitations as they applied to area planning
commissions were removed by 1968 amendment to KRS § 147.660. The Court
rejected this contention out of hand. The other case was Ashland v. Webb see
note 171 et seq. infra and accompanying text. Sources connected with the Miller
(Continued on next page)
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exceed the compensating tax rate.149 In addition to the permissive
increase for school building, the school board by KRS § 160.477
may submit a resolution to the qualified voters of the district
which would produce revenue in excess of the limits established
by law.50 The purposes for which this revenue may be used are
limited to the school lands and buildings and regardless of the
referendum, levies above the compensating tax rate are pro-
hibited.15 The only exception to the compensating tax rate is
the allowance for higher levies where necessary to meet the
interest and principal payments which were outstanding at the
time of the amendment. 2 Apart from these procedures a public
referendum may be held which, if approved by a majority of the
voters, may authorize the levy of any amount, to be used for any
purpose.
153
Having observed how the rollback law sought to limit the
revenue available to school districts the mechanics of the controls
may now be clearer. In each instance where the school board
had authority to raise revenue the special legislation limited the
increases to very specific occasions by imposing a maximum rate
which froze (for the most part) revenue at the 1965 levels regard-
less of changing conditions. The same general approach was
utilized in controlling both county and city taxing districts-only
particular applications differ.
B. Counties
The county taxing unit was also affected by the rollback legisla-
tion. In the attempt to hold the line on tax increases the legislature
amended three statutes. First, KRS § 68.240, which gives the
county budget commission authority to promulgate a budget, was
amended to limit the amount of money the commission could
request. This was done in essentially the same manner as with
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
case indicate an intention to appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court
and if that fails to begin anew with the district court. Lexington Leader, July 7,
1971, at 25, col. 1.
'49KRS § 160.476(4) (Baldwin's 1969). See Board of Edue. v. White,
410 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1966) for an interpretation of this statute.
150 KRS § 160.470(2) (Baldwin's 1969).
151 Id. § (1) (9), (6). Rates approved by voters prior to this amendment
but which have not been levied must be reduced to the compensating tax rate
before they may be levied. Id. § (6).
152 Kl1S § 160.470(6) (Baldwins 1969).1 5 3 See note 138 supra.
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the school budgeting authorities; the amount allowed to be
budgeted was limited so as not to require more revenue from ad
valorum taxes than would have been produced under the pre-
Rusman conditions. 54 The only exceptions were the net assess-
ment growth, the permissive ten percent increase with notice
and hearings, and those levies approved by public vote.
As with the budget controls on the school boards, these limita-
tions were soon faced with a court challenge. Indeed, Rea v. Gal-
latin County Fiscal Court'5 5 was brought some four years prior to
Miller v. Nunnelley.5 6 The end result in both cases was the same;
the Court found the questioned statutes to be constitutional. In
Rea the issues were framed so as to question the legislature's
power to set a maximum rate lower than that prescribed by the
Kentucky Constitution as being the maximum permissable rate.
The challengers contend that once the constitution set such a limit
the legislature did not have the authority to set a lower rate. 57
In rejecting this argument the Court apparently5 8 held that,
although the constitution set a maximum rate, it also conferred
the taxing authority upon the state. When the state delegated
this authority to local subdivisions of government an inherent
power to set limits lower than those contained in section 157
remained with the state. Having exercised such rights in the
establishment of the budget limitations there could be no question
as to the constitutional soundness of the amendments.5 9
The second statute affected was KRS § 178.200 which empow-
ers the fiscal court to sell bonds to raise revenue to construct roads
and bridges. The fiscal court is also empowered to levy a tax of
up to 20 cents per 100 dollars of assessed property in the county.
The rollback amendment altered the statute to the extent that
"for 1966 and all subsequent years" the compensating tax rate
would determine the amount of revenue to be gathered for bonds
issued prior to the amendment.' 60 Just as with the "School Build-
154 See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
'55 422 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1967).
1u S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971).
157 422 S.W.2d 134, 135-36 (Ky. 1967).
15s8 It is difficult to determine, from this opinion, exactly what the Court held.
However, a later decision was more emphatic. See Ashland v. Webb, - S.W.2d
- (Ky. 1971).
159 422 S.W.2d at 137-38.
160 KRS § 178.200(3) (Baldwin's 1969). The amendments also provide for
rates in excess of the compensating tax rate where necessary to meet outstanding
indebtedness. Id. § (4).
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ing Fund" the effect is to limit the revenue to the amount contem-
plated by the fiscal court (and apparently the voters if there has
been an intervening election) when the bonds were issued. 6"
However, contrary to the school situation, the statute is silent
as to bonds issued subsequent to the amendment.162 Apparently
such bonds may be retired by levy of a tax with the rate in excess
of the compensating tax rate.163 Why the fiscal court would
present less danger of rapid tax increase than elected school board
officials is uncertain. Perhaps the answer lies not with the officials
but with the voters and their attitudes toward the two groups.
The third and final amendment to the county taxing power
involved KRS § 178.210. This statute authorized the fiscal court
to submit to special election the levying of a tax to build roads
and bridges. This statute differs from KRS § 178.200 (discussed
above) in that no bonds are issued, rather the money is produced
directly by the tax levy. The 1965 amendments limited the amount
which could be collected on such levies as were approved prior to
the amendment to the compensating tax rate. As in KRS § 178.200,
no limit was placed upon levies submitted to a vote following
adoption of the amendment. 164 This freedom to elect levies as
desired corresponds to that contained in KRS § 157.440 dealing
with the election of a school levy. 65
C. Cities
In contrast to the similarities in the treatment of the school
and county taxing authorities, the approach taken to controlling
the revenue gathered by the city districts is somewhat different.
The special session enacted a new statute, KRS § 182.027, to pro-
vide the limitations. The first paragraph of that statute simply
provides that no city may levy a rate greater than the com-
pensating tax rate. The only exception provided is the ten per-
cent permissive increase, each year for two years. There is no
explicit provision for net assessment growth or for direct public
vote on higher levies. The apparent result of the new statute was
161 See note 149 supra.
162There is a limit, however, upon the total amount of indebtedness which
the county may incur. KRS § 66.310 (Baldwin's 1969).
163 Not to exceed $.20 per $100 of assessed value.
104The amount of indebtedness allowed is limited. See note 160 supra.
ie5 See note 137 supra and accompanying text.
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to limit the available revenue to the 1965 level with two ten
percent increases and no more.
However, a 1966 case involving the voted levy exception
provided the cities with that means of increasing revenue. Raque
v. Louisville166 involved a tax levied to retire bonds issued under
a law,167 which allowed such issue and levy following a public
referendum. The amount of the bonds issued, although within
the debt limitations imposed on the city, would require a levy of
a rate in excess of the compensating tax rate set forth in IKRS §
132.027. A taxpayer brought the suit to declare the rate in excess
of the rollback limits to be void. 68 The argument was based on
the absence of a provision allowing the levy of voted rates above
the compensating tax rate. In the case of school or county taxing
authority this exception was clearly made and the taxpayer con-
tended that the absence of a similar provision for the cities evi-
denced an intent to deny such exception to cities.'69
In rejecting this interpretation the Court pointed out that such
a reading of the statute would bring it into conflict with section
159 of the Kentucky Constitution which requires any taxing unit
which is to assume debt must also levy a tax sufficient to retire
the debt. That the city had the authority to assume debt upon
vote of a majority of the taxpayers was the settled construction
of section 157. With this reasoning the Court held the excess levy
to be proper.
170
The next court test for the rollback amendments as they
applied to the cities came in Ashland v. Webb. 7 ' The facts were
quite simple. The city of Ashland had adopted an ordinance
authorizing the levying of a tax in excess of the limits of KRS §
182.027. A taxpayer brought suit to enjoin collection of the
excess and an injunction was granted by the circuit court. On
appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
7 2
The appellants brought only two arguments to the Court. First,
that the statute setting a maximum tax rate lower than that
166 402 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1966).
167KRS § 66.050 (Baldwin's 1969).
168 402 S.W.2d 697-98 (Ky. 1966).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 698-99.
171 Ashland v. Webb, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971). This was one of the
two companion cases to Miller v. Nunnelley. See note 148 supra.
172 Apblqnd v. Webb, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971),
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prescribed by section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution was un-
constitutional. The Court rejected this contention citing Rea v.
Gallatin Fiscal Court as controlling on the issue.1 73 The second
contention was that the cities were not given the benefit of
net assessment growth as a means of increasing the available
revenue. Such condition was alleged to be unconstitutional
discrimination. The response from the majority was that it
was "not entirely convinced that cities [were] denied net as-
sessment growth;"1 74 and even if they were so denied, there
was no constitutional requirement that cities "be treated the same
as counties as far as concerns the extent of their tax levying
powers." 75 With this the Court affirmed the denial of Ashland's
authority to authorize tax levies in excess of the compensating
tax rate.
The decision in Raque applies only to levies used to retire
indebtedness incurred by vote.176 In this respect the city taxing
authority now has the same power as the county and school units.
However, the latter two governmental units are also able to
present their qualified voters with the opportunity to vote higher
levies in the absence of indebtedness. 77 Indeed, this was the
aspect relied upon by the Court in Miller to overcome the con-
stitutional challenge that the rollback law perpetuated the
unconstitutional pre-Russman situation.' 8 There is no similar
provision by which the cities may increase the amount of revenue
available to them. The obvious question then is whether the
rollback amendments, as applied to cities, are constitutional.
Although declared to be so in Ashland, that case dealt only with
the two proffered arguments and the decision was based upon
the answers to those particular argumentsY.9 The success of a
challenge supported by the above reasoning remains to be seen.
V. EFFECT OF ROLLBACK ON INCREASING REVENUE PRODUCTON
Having examined the effect of the rollback law on the indi-
vidual taxing authorities, the impact of these changes on local
173 See notes 155-59 supra and accompanying text.
174 Ashland v. Webb, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971).
175 Id.
176 See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
1
7 7 See notes 137-38, 164-65 supra and accompanying text.
178 See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
179 Ashland v. Webb, - S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971).
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government should be evident. Kentucky's local governing bodies
rely primarily on the revenue produced by property taxes to
finance their operations. Any limitation upon available revenue
which is tied to the 1965 level must necessarily hamstring efforts
to provide the level of services demanded in the 1970's. 80
Acknowledging this fact, the legislature provided the previously
discussed exceptions to the otherwise frozen tax limits. But the
effectiveness of those provisions for increasing revenue must be
questioned.
A. Flexibility
Local governments must plan their expenditures over some
period of time, the period often varying with different items in
the same budget. 8' With any of the taxing authorities most
expenditures for the year may be accurately predicted and pro-
vision made for them. However, short term emergency conditions
may arise calling for the expenditure of unforeseen funds. Like-
wise, a budget year may see the completion of some phase of a
long term construction project which, due to inflation, presents
more bills than anticipated.
All of these factors may occur in any taxing authority thus
producing a need for varying amounts of revenue. While the
property tax itself may not be an exceptional means of meeting
the demands for different amounts of revenue it is the main source
of income for the three types of taxing districts under discussion.8 2
When the property tax growth is limited to the exceptions pro-
vided in the rollback amendments any flexibility which may have
been present is sorely restricted. To illustrate: assume a taxing
district has come to the start of its fiscal year with an ongoing
project that has just returned bills which will demand revenue in
excess of the past budget. How may revenue be expanded to meet
this temporary need? If the increase is less than 10% of the
previous year's revenue and if the need arose in 1966 or 1967,
then the authority could have increased revenue following
180 Even if individual demand has remained constant the population increase
will produce a need for more revenue.
181 For example, salaries will require a pre-determined outlay which is
totally included within the time span of a yearly budget. A building project, on
the other hand, may continue over many budgets, requiring changing amounts of
revenue.182 See 44 LRC, supra note 37, at 1.
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public hearings. However, such increases are no longer open to
any of the taxing units. 83 Another possibility lies with the net
assessment growth which has occurred in property taxable by the
unit.'84 But, at no time was there any means of correlating this
increase with the needed revenue. Any similarity between the
two would be mere coincidence and, if the taxing unit were a
city, this means of gathering additional revenue might not even
be available."8 The only other means of increasing revenue is by
public vote, either for permission to sell bonds or to levy an extra
tax. Both voting techniques have short-comings, not the least of
which is the difficulty in getting voter approval. 8 6 Beyond this
hurdle there are other problems: bonds may not be readily
marketable; interest rates may be prohibitive; time requirements
for meeting the demand for revenue may be such that no time is
available for holding a special election; perhaps the cost of hold-
ing an election will exceed the amount of revenue needed; and,
if the taxing unit is a city apparently the "direct election" of a levy
is prohibited. 87 From this it can be seen that as a means of
providing flexibility in the gathering of revenue, the rollback
amendments leave much to be desired.
B. Predictability
Closely related to the need for flexibility in the budgeting of
revenue is the need for predictability. Any of the taxing units
will require some additional expansion over a long period of time.
To finance such growth a steady, predictable source of added in-
come is needed. 8 Obviously this predictability cannot be pro-
183 If the taxing authority were a school district some increase may have
become available beginning with the 1970-71 school year. The 1970 regular session
of the legislature amended KRS § 160.470 so as to allow those school districts
which were not taking at the maximum rate in 1965 to increase their present
levy to produce an amount equal to the revenue that would have been producedby the maximum levy in 1965. This sum is not to include those exceptions allowed
under the rollback amendments such as net assessment growth and voted levies.
Similar changes were made in KRS § 160.477 (voted school building fund) and
KRS § 157.440 (local tax effort requirement). Ky. Acts, ch. 118 (1970).184 Prior to 1971 this exception did not deal with increases other than im-provements and new property. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
185 See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text.p8o See notes 192, 207-08 infra and accompanying text.
'8 7 See note 178 supra and accompanying text.
1S8Admittedly the rollback provisions provide an extremely predictable
amount of revenue but little provision is made for added growth. Such growth
simply must take place if only for the simple reason that there are more peoplewithin a taxing unit.
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vided by the ten percent permissive increases nor by the net
assessment growth. As indicated above, such increases are no
longer available or their occurrence bears no relationship to the
need. As with flexibility, the voting exceptions provide the only
means of predictable revenue increases."" However, the same
problems of desirability and availability apply in consideration
of predictability. But perhaps voted levies provide the most
equitable means of producing a predictable increase of revenue
over a long period of time.190
C. Achieving Results
A third consideration in providing means of increasing revenue
is the difficulty of achieving the desired results. When they
were available the ten percent permissive increases were readily
accessible to the taxing officials, but they are now impossible to
apply. In contrast, degrees of difficulty cannot even be considered
in discussing net assessment growth since such increases lie
beyond the direct control of the levying agents. 191 As indicated
earlier, perhaps the greatest drawback to the voted levies is the
difficulty in getting voter approval. This difficulty was, to some
extent, probably anticipated by the legislators who passed the
rollback amendment indeed forcing local officials to go to the
voters was one purpose of the changes. 92 While reluctance to
vote increased taxes on the part of the taxpayer is understandable,
the wisdom of tying all controllable increases to direct voter
approval is questionable. Certainly the elitist attitudes of some
are to be rejected, 193 likewise note must be taken of the tremen-
dous gulf between the demands of the public and their willingness
to pay for these services. It is natural to avoid any additional
outlay in taxes paid when the object of this revenue lies sometime
in the future or is some inscrutable but necessary governmental
service.
189 Obviously such revenue is predictable only after the levy has been voted.
19' Property tax levies are classically regressive in their impact and the
majority of voters may fall into the group hardest hit by a levy.
191 About the only available control is through their ability to promote
economic growth.
192 See Miller v. Nunnelley, -- S.W.2d - (Ky. 1971).
3
9 3 For one of the best examples of this type of tinking see Courier-Journal &
Times (Louisville), June 20, 1971, § F, at 2, col. 3.
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Be that as it may, the fact remains that revenue is limited,
essentially, to the 1965 level. The exceptions provided contain
only limited relief. The 10% permissive increases were flexible,
predictable, and relatively easy to achieve but are now no longer
available. The net assessment growth occurs regardless of action
by local officers, it is unpredictable to the extent that plans can
be made only on the revenue added by the immediately pre-
ceeding assessment period and in addition it seems to be unavail-
able to the cities. The voted levies are not extremely flexible but
they do provide a predictable source of revenue once the levies
have been authorized. The problem with these exceptions lies
in the difficulty in achieving voter acceptance.
VI. TBE INADEQUACY OF THE ROLLBACK LAw
AS PERMANENT LEGISLAION
Public fear coupled with political pressure resulted in the
hastily drawn "rollback" law. As is characteristic of legislation
enacted in haste to meet an immediate need, structural short-
comings later became evident. To justify the faults it may,
perhaps, be said that the legislature did not intend the rollback
amendments to be permanent. When the provisions themselves
are examined this response seems accurate. For example the ten
percent permissive increases were only valid for a two year period
which was to end the same year as the occurrence of a regularly
scheduled legislative session.194 If a ten percent increase was
permissable for each of the first two years why should they not
be available in later years? Surely there was no thought that the
demand for revenue would decrease. The only conclusion is that
some change was anticipated within those two years.'95 Likewise,
commentators both before 6 and subsequent to enactment of'
97
the amendments have indicated a belief that the changes were
I94 See, e.g., KRS § 160.470 (Baldwin's 1969).
195 Such conclusion is strengthened by the treatment accorded the public
utility taxing districts. In the original 1965 amendments, the effect would have
been to shift a greater percentage of the property tax burden from the utilities to
the individual. This was prevented by an amendment which specifically imposed
rates upon the utilities so as to retain the pre-Russman status quo. However, these
restrictions were to last only two years and then the only limitations were to be
the constitutional rate limits. Ky. Acts, ch. 41 (1966). For a more complete
examination of the public utilities' treatment see 44 LRC, supra note 37, at 11.
106 See note 114 supra.
Z97 .Sqe 44 LRC 9-12,
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only temporary. In light of the tumultous state of affairs at the
time of the special session little permanent planning could have
been done; there seems no possible conclusion other than that
the changes were not to be permanent.
Assuming for the moment that the rollback amendments were
intended to stand as permanent law, the legislation leaves much
to be desired. For example, the provisions which deal with the
schools are complete and thorough but as the county and city
taxing authorities are dealt with the provisions become more
brief and provisions are omitted. The most fiagarant example is
the handling of the cities. Only one change was made 98 and it
left the cities without specific authority to levy a tax for voted
indebtedness, although similar provisions had been included in
the school and county amendments. Likewise, there was no
provision for utilization of net assessment growth; nor was there
any allowance for public vote on direct levies. These structural
omissions will require judicial construction if the cities are to
receive any of these benefits, and there is no legislative indication
as to whether it was intended that they receive such benefits. In
addition, other constitutional shortcomings have produced amend-
ments from time to time.'99 All of which illustrates the need for
new legislation, even assuming that the limitations on revenue
were intended to be permanent.
Whether or not the rollback law was intended to be a perma-
nent answer to Russman, the fact remains that there are deficien-
cies in the legislation. The fact also remains that there has been
little legislative action to correct the situation. One possible
answer to the problem might be envisioned in judicial interpreta-
tion, but courts are often unwilling to "rewrite" deficient laws.
Challenges to the amendments on constitutional grounds have
already been mounted and these attacks were repelled by the
Court of Appeals.n°° While some questions may be raised as to
the accuracy of these decisions and although other constitutional
attacks can be conceived, 0' the important aspect in terms of
relief for revenue starved taxing districts is that no such relief is
198 There was another change but it was the creation of a new statute to
handle a joint city-school tax. See KRS § 132.200(2)-(3) (Baldwin's 1969).
199 See notes 133, 183 supra.
20o See notes 140, 155, 166, 171 supra.
201 See, e.g., notes 178-79 supra and accompanying text,
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likely from the Court. °2 It is submitted that the Court has chosen
to place the burden of discovering some means of meeting the
demands of local governments squarely upon the legislature (and
who is to say that is not where it belongs).
Left without judicial or legislative intervention, the rollback
amendments seriously hamper revenue production for the various
local taxing authorities. The ten percent permissive increase in
revenue is no longer available and the net assessment growth is
inflexible and not very predictable. Often the only hope lies in
direct voter appeal. But many of the governmental processes of
today are inexplicable even to men learned in the field; they
become impossible when made the direct object of an election.0 3
It should be no surprise that when faced with a choice of a tax
for some purpose which he does not understand and no tax, a voter
will choose not to levy the tax. This need not be an argument for
paternalistic government, but some balance is needed between
officials, who dictate decisions, and public elections on issues not
fully understood by the electorate. One of the purposes of repre-
sentative government and the use of elected officials is an attempt
to strike some balance between these extremes. Election of local
tax officials allows the public to register disapproval of taxing
policies while permitting the day-to-day business of government
to continue. When the rollback amendment came into effect this
balance was destroyed by the requirement for public vote on
almost every increase in tax revenue.0 4 The announced reason
for this imbalance was a fear of local officials; i.e., that the public
had lost control of their local officials and the imbalance had
already swung too far in favor of those officials.20 5 If that were
the case then remedial legislation dealing with the selection of
officials rather than perpetual limitations of revenue would seem
the appropriate action.
202 Perhaps it is simply too soon to expect action from the Court in view of
the time lapse between Louisville Railway and Russman.
203 The Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue recently announced a "breathing
spell" in attempts by the Department of Revenue to equalize assessment levels
across the state. Mr. Luckett acknowledged that this lull, and previous ones,
coincide with the occurrence of general elections. In explanation he indicated that
equalization was a technical subject which was inappropriate as an election issue.
204 If elected officials are so irresponsible as to require such control the
question arises as to why the legislature has not subjected its decision-making
power to immediate review by the public.
205 See notes 107-13 supra and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout the preceeding pages the history of fair cash value
assessment has been traced through its judicial wanderings to the
final affirmation in Russman. Likewise the response to that de-
cision has been chronicled and analyzed in an attempt to deter-
mine the appropriateness of the response. It is the purpose of
this paper to show, in a limited way, the inadequacies of the
legislative response in the rollback amendments and to underline
the need for some type of legislative action. °0 It is not the pur-
pose of this note to indicate what changes should be made, that
is a subject unto itself. There are many alternatives: return to
the statutory language before the amendments; require public
approval by vote on each budget each year; establishment of a
minimum property requirement which must be surpassed before
any individual could be taxed; and, perhaps the most equitable,
abolition of the property tax altogether. This is surely not an
exhaustive list, but whatever course may be chosen, it is manda-
tory that some action be taken.
William L. Stevens
206 Because of its widespread occurrence no attempt has been made to chron-
icle the need for more revenue.
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